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INSURANCE LAW AND THE PRINCIPLE 
OF INDEMNITY IN LIGHT OF 
RIDGECREST NZ LTD V IAG NEW 
ZEALAND LTD 
Kasia Ginders* 
When the Supreme Court discussed the principle of indemnity in Ridgecrest NZ Ltd v IAG New 
Zealand Ltd, it was referred to as "awkward" in the context of a replacement policy. The application 
of the indemnity principle in the case raises further questions about the nature of the principle in 
insurance contracts. It is submitted that the indemnity principle is currently enforceable not as a legal 
test nor as a policy-based presumption; rather, it is applicable mostly because it is presumed the 
parties intended it to apply. This conclusion draws on both consideration of the rationales and rules 
of, exceptions to, and law reform concerning the principle. It also draws on analysis of the principle 
in light of Ridgecrest and two other recent cases following the Christchurch earthquakes that deal 
with the principle of indemnity. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The principle of indemnity in insurance law holds that an insured is entitled to receive a full 
indemnity for his or her loss, no more and no less. However, Ridgecrest NZ Ltd v IAG New Zealand 
Ltd (Ridgecrest), a 2014 case in the New Zealand Supreme Court, has brought the nature of the 
principle into question. When an insured building owned by Ridgecrest NZ Ltd (Ridgecrest) sustained 
damage in successive Canterbury earthquakes, the Supreme Court held that Ridgecrest could claim 
up to the full amount of the sum insured per happening, despite being underinsured and not having 
repaired the damage from the earlier quakes when the insured building became a total loss. 1 
Ridgecrest could therefore obtain more than the amount they had insured for, a result that appears to 
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1  Ridgecrest NZ Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2014] NZSC 117, [2015] 1 NZLR 40 [Ridgecrest]. 
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be somewhat at odds with the indemnity principle. This article explores the uncertainties surrounding 
the scope of the principle that arise in light of the decision in Ridgecrest. 
Two other cases from 2014 dealing with the indemnity principle and Canterbury quake damage 
are also considered. The first is Tower Insurance Ltd v Skyward Aviation 2008 Ltd (Skyward), a 
Supreme Court decision that affirms the approach taken in Ridgecrest.2 Also discussed is the decision 
in QBE Insurance (International) Ltd v Wild South Holdings Ltd (QBE Insurance), released a few 
weeks after Ridgecrest, in which the Court of Appeal clearly stated that the principle of indemnity 
survived Ridgecrest. 3  Before these more recent cases are dealt with, this article evaluates the 
significance of three elements of the indemnity principle: the principle's underlying rationales, the 
rules the principle creates and supports, and the exceptions to the principle. Relevant law reform is 
also considered.  
The question at the heart of this article is whether the principle of indemnity is truly a legal 
principle. Does it operate as a policy-based presumption that contracts must be interpreted consistently 
with, or is it simply descriptive of a particular type of contract? In other words, do courts have a 
discretion or perhaps an obligation to interpret contracts to be consistent with the principle, or is the 
concept of a no more and no less full indemnity merely applicable where it can be presumed the parties 
intended it to apply? It is argued that the latter appears more likely following Ridgecrest.  
II INDEMNITY 
A Various Meanings 
The word "indemnity" has several interlinked meanings in the insurance context. It may describe 
a type of policy, a measure of loss, or the so-called principle of indemnity. This article seeks to more 
accurately assess the scope of the third meaning. Courts may use the term indemnity without clearly 
distinguishing which meaning is intended, leading to some confusion. For clarity, the first two 
meanings mentioned are briefly explained below before discussion of the principle itself.  
First, indemnity provides a distinction between contracts of indemnity, which provide cover 
for loss suffered, and contracts based on contingencies. "Loss suffered" in itself indicates the premise 
upon which the indemnity principle is based: loss is an essential element of indemnity 
insurance.4 Contingency contracts, in comparison, provide for a specified amount of money to be paid 
when an insured event occurs irrespective of loss suffered, for example, life insurance.5 The difference 
  
2  Tower Insurance Ltd v Skyward Aviation 2008 Ltd [2014] NZSC 185, [2015] 1 NZLR 341 [Skyward]. 
3  QBE Insurance (International) Ltd v Wild South Holdings Ltd [2014] NZCA 447, [2015] 2 NZLR 24 [QBE 
Insurance], at [77]–[80]. 
4  Robert Merkin and Chris Nicoll (eds) Colinvaux's Law of Insurance in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2014) at 1.1.2(9). 
5  See Gould v Curtis [1913] 3 KB 84 (CA) at 95 per Buckley LJ. 
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lies principally in the fact that one cannot put a price on certain things, like loss of life, so the insurance 
received cannot be based on pecuniary loss.6 The indemnity principle, unsurprisingly, operates only 
in the context of indemnity policies.  
Secondly, in the case of an insured event occurring under an indemnity contract, policies may 
offer different options for measuring the insurer's liability to cover the insured's loss. Indemnity value 
is one method. It involves measuring the loss caused by assessing the difference between the insured's 
position immediately before and after the event. This can be contrasted with replacement cover, where 
the amount required to indemnify the insured is calculated based on the cost of replacing or 
reinstating the thing insured, without making deductions for depreciation in value (or the increased 
cost of meeting new building standards in respect of property insurance).  
B Scope of the Indemnity Principle: Options 
In the leading case of Castellain v Preston, the indemnity principle was described as 
"fundamental" to insurance,7 but it is doubtful whether the modern scope and application of the 
principle supports such a statement. The scope of the indemnity principle, it is submitted, lies 
somewhere along a scale between a legal test as a high water-mark, and a measure of loss at the low 
water-mark. Four definitions are used in this article as points of reference to help determine where the 
principle fits on the scale.  
1 Legal test 
While the principle is said to be vital to insurance, there is little to suggest it constitutes a strict 
and compulsory legal test. It is not explicitly enshrined in statute,8 and there are several exceptions to 
the principle which clearly demonstrate that it is not compulsory.9 Few, if any, substantive arguments 
exist for affording the principle the status of a legal test. This article does not submit it as a possibility, 
but it is useful as a point of comparison for the other definitions. 
2 Policy-based presumption 
This option allows the principle greater scope to play a guiding role in the interpretation of 
contracts. Professor McGee seems to take this approach, stating that the principle is "properly 
regarded as a presumption rather than as a rule of law", and that the presumption may be rebutted by 
appropriate wording in a policy.10 The effort required to rebut such a presumption would reflect the 
  
6  At 95. 
7  Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QBD 380 (CA) at 386 per Brett LJ. 
8  Although the Marine Insurance Act 1908 indirectly acknowledges the principle with provisions that conform 
to the requirements of the indemnity principle. See for example ss 33, 67 and 69.  
9  See below at II C 3. 
10  Andrew McGee The Modern Law of Insurance (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, London, 2011) at 4.17.  
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policy arguments underlying the principle;11 these arguments indicate the presumption should not be 
disregarded lightly. 
3 Presumed intention 
This more descriptive approach views the indemnity principle as something that acts to prevent 
the intentions of the parties being frustrated by presuming no more than a full indemnity was intended. 
Not carrying the same weight as a policy-based presumption, this option focuses more on the 
intentions of the parties than policy. It is accepted as the most likely option by Neil Campbell and 
Barnaby Stewart in their article "Prevention of Performance in Replacement Cost Insurance – 
Preventing a Fictional Response".12 They state that the indemnity principle:13 
… can be explained either as a matter of presumed contractual intention (this is what the parties meant by 
"indemnity") or as a matter of broad policy (the law should not allow insurance contracts to be used as a 
means of improving the insured's position). 
They go on to suggest that the former is more likely in Commonwealth countries. This reasoning is 
discussed in more detail below.14 
4 Business practice 
This option leaves the indemnity principle as merely descriptive of a common method of crafting 
insurance policies or measuring loss. It has the potential to carry more weight than just a measure of 
loss in that if clearly recognised as common business practice, the courts might choose to follow the 
principle when faced with ambiguity in a policy.15 However, the discussion in Ridgecrest on the 
indemnity principle suggests it has more legal substance than just a method of business practice.   
These definitions are starting points, not clear cut options; it is submitted that the scope of the 
principle will lie somewhere between a policy-based presumption and a presumed intention approach. 
C Evaluating the Scope of the Principle 
Analysis of several elements of the indemnity principle provides a framework for exploring its 
scope. This analysis is built upon when the judgments from Ridgecrest, Skyward and QBE Insurance 
are considered below. The elements are: the stated rationales that underlie the principle; the specific 
  
11  See discussion of the arguments below at II C 1. 
12  Neil Campbell and Barnaby Stewart "Prevention of Performance in Replacement Cost Insurance – Preventing 
a Fictional Response" (2002) 10 Otago LR 229. See also Paul Michalik and Christopher Boys Insurance 
Claims in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at 5.3, where a similar approach is taken. 
13  At n 3. 
14  See below at IV A. 
15  See discussion in Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd  [2014] NZSC 147, [2015] 1 NZLR 432, at 
[77]–[79] and [88]–[93]. 
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rules which the principle creates and supports; and the exceptions to the principle. A brief discussion 
of law reform concerning the principle is also included.  
1 Rationales 
The rationales of the indemnity principle are the key starting point. Understanding the rationales 
and their current relevance is necessary to assess the weight of the policies on which a principle that 
is more akin to a legal test or presumption might be based. The extent to which the rationales have 
become superfluous indicates the extent to which the scope of the principle should fall somewhere 
lower on the scale, towards mere business practice. 
Three reasons are commonly given as justification for the principle of indemnity: avoiding 
windfalls to the insured, fraud prevention, and ensuring that the contract is not a wagering one.  
(a) Avoiding windfall 
Inherent in the notion that an insurance contract should provide no more and no less than a full 
indemnity is the goal of preventing windfalls to either party. This aspect is emphasised in Castellain 
v Preston. Brett LJ declared that:16  
The very foundation … of every rule which has been applied to insurance law is this, namely, that the 
contract of insurance contained in a marine or fire policy is a contract of indemnity, and of indemnity 
only, and that this contract means that the assured, in case of a loss against which the policy has been 
made, shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemnified. That is the fundamental 
principle of insurance, and if ever a proposition is brought forward which is at variance with it … that 
proposition must certainly be wrong.  
The object of indemnity is simply to put the insured in the position they would have been in had 
the loss not occurred.17 The reason for this limitation was elaborated on by Lord Shaw in the 1921 
case of British & Foreign Insurance Co Ltd v Wilson Shipping Co Ltd. He warned against extending 
the indemnity principle in that it would lead to a situation "not in the region of indemnity against loss, 
but in the region of profit-earning".18 
An example of a New Zealand case where the principle prevented unfair profit by the assured is 
the requirement in Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Roberts (Guardian) 
that the insured account for any amount received that exceeded her personal liability for the property 
insured.19 The respondent, Roberts, hired a car from Hertz for 16 days under a contract limiting her 
  
16  Castellain v Preston, above n 7, at 386 per Brett LJ. 
17  Malcolm Clarke Policies and Perceptions of Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 200) at 220.  
18  British & Foreign Insurance Co Ltd v Wilson Shipping Co Ltd [1921] 1 AC 188 (HL), at 207. 
19  Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Roberts [1991] 2 NZLR 106 (HC). 
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liability for damage to the car to $100. Roberts entered into an insurance contract with the appellant 
for damage caused to the vehicle. The car suffered $6775.20 of damage during the hire period. The 
insurer sought to limit its liability to Roberts' personal liability to Hertz of $100; it was argued this 
was the true indemnity value. 
While the court noted that an insured who did not own property could insure to protect against the 
full amount of loss or damage, if so they would be required to account for the amount over and above 
their personal liability for the property to the true owner.20 This was therefore not "inconsistent with 
the overriding principle that insurance of goods is a contract of indemnity",21 as the insured herself 
could not profit from the loss.  
However, one can argue that the indemnity principle is not necessary to prevent unfair profit from 
an insurance contract. In most insurance contracts, an interpretation which allowed an insured to profit 
from a loss would be obviously outside the contemplation of the contracting parties, and thus a court 
would not permit such an outcome regardless of the principle. Other contracts may take account of 
the possibility of profit, and have appropriate premiums that reflect this. For example, replacement 
policies, where premiums are calculated based on the possibility of more than an indemnity being 
received.22 Interpretation using ordinary contract principles that look to the intent of the parties can 
equally achieve the purpose of avoiding unfair profit. Under this approach, the principle becomes a 
kind of self-fulfilling prophecy; it applies mostly because the parties expect it to apply, and structure 
their contract accordingly.  
However, it would be unfair for an insured to obtain more than a full indemnity if a third party 
were consequently detrimentally affected. For example, a bailee whose interest is limited but who 
insures for the full value of the item. To the extent that prevention of windfall acts to protect the 
interests of third parties like Hertz and also those of insurers in cases of subrogation, the principle is 
probably much more compulsory in nature.23 However, while the doctrine of subrogation seeks to 
vindicate the principle of indemnity, 24  the principle itself is not necessary to prevent windfall. 
Subrogation may also be enforced through an equitable remedy to prevent unjust windfall, where not 
contractually arranged for.25 Further, Lord Reid in A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd v Hepburn stated that 
  
20  At 114. 
21  A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd v Hepburn [1966] AC 451 (HL) at 422 per Lord Reid as cited in Guardian Royal 
Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Roberts, above n 19, at 112.  
22  John Lowry and Philip Rawlings Insurance Law: Doctrines and Principles (3rd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2011) at 265. 
23  In cases of marine insurance, statute makes the situation clear for marine insurance: insurers have an automatic 
right to subrogation under s 79 of the Marine Insurance Act 1908. 
24  Lord Napier and Ettrick v Hunter [1993] AC 713 (HL) at 744. Although the doctrine may be somewhat 
unnecessary: almost all insurers will have subrogation clauses in their insurance policies. 
25  Malcolm A Clarke (ed) The Law of Insurance Contracts (6th ed, Informa Law, London, 2009) at 1022–1025. 
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an insured's accountability to a true owner (like Hertz) was that of a trustee, suggesting equity fulfils 
the same purpose as the principle in this type of situation.26 
(b) Prevention of fraud  
A more persuasive reason for not allowing an insured to profit is fraud prevention. If the insured 
stands to profit following a loss, the incentive to cause loss increases, and the motivation to take 
precautions to avoid loss or damage is diminished. The latter is more insidious as it is not in itself 
fraudulent. If claims increase (or insurers perceive that they have increased), eventually so will 
premiums, distorting the process of spreading risk through insurance, as honest people end up paying 
for those who are dishonest or deliberately careless.27  
Lord Mansfield CJ notes in Godin v London Assurance Co that "the rule was calculated to prevent 
fraud; lest the temptation of gain should occasion unfair and wilful losses".28 However, this statement 
was made in 1758. The insurance market and commercial world has undoubtedly changed 
substantially since then, and new methods have been adopted to alleviate the threat of fraud. In fact, 
insurers are required under the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010 (IPSA) to be subject to 
an appropriate risk management programme. 29  The programme must describe the insurer's risk 
assessment process and procedures for identifying and managing risks to financial security, including 
insurance risks.30 
One example of insurers adapting to change concerns the introduction of replacement value 
policies, which offer cover on a new-for-old basis. The insured is able to obtain cover for purchase of 
a new version of the insured subject matter, often allowing for receipt of more than a full indemnity, 
creating an increased moral hazard for insurers.31 Two steps are typically taken to manage the moral 
hazard associated with replacement cost insurance.32 The first is by placing limitations that ensure the 
proceeds of the policy will be spent on reinstating the property, and the second is requiring 
reinstatement to be implemented with reasonable dispatch.33  
In one sense, the development of such protective mechanisms by insurers illustrates the value of 
the indemnity principle in preventing fraud when replacement value insurance is not offered. If the 
  
26  A Tomlinson (Hauliers) Ltd v Hepburn, above n 21, at 422 per Lord Reid. 
27  JP Van Niekerk "Fraudulent Insurance Claims" (2000) 12 SA Merc LJ 69 at 71. See also Clarke, above n 17, 
at 252–253. 
28  Godin v London Assurance Co (1758) 1 Burr 489, 97 ER 419 (KB) at 421 per Lord Mansfield CJ.  
29  Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010, s 73(1).  
30  Section 73(2). 
31  Campbell and Stewart, above n 12, at 232. 
32  At 232. 
33  At 232. 
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potential for profit justifies special measures to prevent wrongdoing, impliedly they are necessary to 
plug a gap normally filled by the indemnity principle. The Insurance Council of New Zealand's 
approach to indemnity further supports the argument that fraud prevention is still a relevant rationale; 
it states that if an insured were put in a "better position after an insurance claim there would be a 
financial incentive to make claims".34 
However, there has not been the same resistance to the introduction of replacement value policies 
in Commonwealth jurisdictions as that which took place in the United States. This suggests that less 
importance is placed in New Zealand on the indemnity principle as a method of fraud prevention. In 
the United States, where the principle is considered a "matter of public policy", replacement value 
policies initially required legislative approval.35 In fact, at first replacement coverage was only 
offered where the moral risk was deemed low, for example for insuring public utilities, schools and 
large manufacturers.36 Campbell and Stewart argue that the freedom to contract out of the principle 
in Commonwealth jurisdictions means a presumed intention rationalisation of the principle is more 
likely.37 
The development of self-regulation methods through IPSA and in response to the risks associated 
with replacement policies also supports the notion that the indemnity principle is now more 
appropriately deemed a default presumption of intention, and that parties have the freedom to make 
their own assessment of risk and contract accordingly. That is to say, the intention of the parties 
contracting is more critical to the interpretation of an insurance contract than the indemnity principle's 
role in fraud prevention. The requirements of IPSA indicate that insurers have the ability to manage 
the risk of fraud through other methods if they choose,38 and therefore the indemnity principle is not 
strictly necessary.  
A counterargument is that these changes show that a presumption that the principle applies should 
be rebuttable only where the contract shows evidence of careful management of the risk of fraud. That 
is to say, the courts have allowed replacement policies and other policies which may allow a profit 
with little fuss only because they believe insurers have taken proper steps to address the risk.39 This 
  
34  "Insurance Concepts" (13 June 2014) Insurance Council of New Zealand <www.icnz.org.nz>. 
35  Campbell and Stewart, above n 12, at 231. 
36  Leo Jordan "What Price Rebuilding? A Look at Replacement Cost Policies" (1990) 19 Brief 17 at 18. 
37  Campbell and Stewart, above n 12, at n 7. 
38  For example the widespread introduction of limiting policies to a sum insured following the Christchurch 
earthquakes, discussed below at IV D. 
39  However, see discussion of Skyward at III B below. The Supreme Court's description of Tower being 
"content" to manage the risks of a replacement value policy in its own way suggests that insurers have a level 
of autonomy incompatible with this interpretation. See Skyward, above n 2, at [26]–[28]. 
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slightly more paternal approach aligns more closely with a policy-based conception of the principle, 
placing the need to discourage fraud above contractual intent. 
(c) Wagering contracts 
While an insurance contract usually only protects a pre-existing interest, a potential for profit 
would create a new interest in the outcome, encouraging entrance into the contract because of the 
chance for profit – a kind of wager. Both courts and commentators have raised concerns about this.  
In British Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Monson, the High Court of Australia declared that underlying 
the indemnity principle is "the law's policy not to allow gambling in the form of insurance",40 and 
Bowen LJ warned against insurance contracts becoming mere "speculation for gain" in Castellain v 
Preston.41 McGee has also raised concerns about the extent to which a replacement value policy 
becomes a wagering one by allowing an insured to make a profit.42   
However, while wagering contracts in insurance remain illegal under statute in other jurisdictions 
such as Australia and England, this rationale has little legal application in New Zealand today. The 
provision in the Insurance Law Reform Act 1985 prohibiting contracts by way of gaming or 
wagering43 was repealed by the Gambling Act 2003,44 although they remain illegal in respect of 
marine insurance.45 This renders the third rationale largely irrelevant in New Zealand. Further, 
wagering insurance contracts are no longer the social problem that they were when they were first 
made illegal.46  
2 Rules  
It was made clear in Castellain v Preston, and is noted by John Lowry and Phillip Rawlings, that 
"the overriding requirement of indemnity can be seen to underlie the rules which operate in the event 
of an insured loss".47 These rules are evidence of how the indemnity principle applies in a more 
practical sense. Some of the rules have already been mentioned, for example the doctrine of 
subrogation. Other rules include (but are not limited to) the doctrine of merger and the distinction 
between the loss to the insured and rateable value. 
  
40  British Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Monson (1964) 111 CLR 86 (HCA) at 94.  
41  Castellain v Preston, above n 7, at 399 and 401. 
42  McGee, above n 10, at 4.17. 
43  Insurance Law Reform Act 1985, s 7(2)(b). 
44  Gambling Act 2003, s 374. 
45  Marine Insurance Act 1908, s 5. 
46  Michalik and Boys, above n 12, at 5.2. 
47  Lowry and Rawlings, above n 22, at 264. 
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The doctrine of merger provides that where a partial loss is followed by a total loss, unfinished 
repair costs are subsumed in the costs payable for the total loss. It is primarily an issue in marine 
insurance, where further loss may occur before repairs are able to be completed.  While it was deemed 
to also be applicable in non-marine insurance in Crystal Imports Ltd v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's 
of London, 48  the Supreme Court in Ridgecrest decided otherwise. However, the authors of 
Colinvaux's Law of Insurance in New Zealand (Colinvaux) raise some doubts about this analysis.49  
Falcon Investments Corporation (NZ) Ltd v State Insurance General Manager is a case which 
demonstrates the distinction between indemnity against the loss to the insured rather than for the value 
of the subject matter. The insured purchased a house, intending to demolish it and replace it with flats. 
While this was being arranged, the house was leased and insured for fire damage. Not long after, the 
tenant caused damage to the house and three days after that, it was damaged beyond repair by fire. 
The judge determined that in the circumstances, the loss to the insured was distinguishable from the 
value of the house. The actual harm suffered was the loss of rent from the house for the 12 months it 
was to be let before demolition. Deducted from this was the cost of repairing the damage caused by 
the tenants and the saving made in demolition costs as a result of the fire.50 The rule applied in the 
case is an application of the principle: if the insured had received cover for the full value for the house 
when his intention was to demolish it, he would have profited from his loss. 
These rules demonstrate the potential scope of the principle in influencing contract interpretation 
and show it is more than just business practice. However, they do not go so far as to establish it as 
being of mandatory application, as evidenced by the exceptions discussed below. 
3 Exceptions 
Despite Brett LJ's suggestion that any proposition contrary to the principle must be incorrect,51 it 
is now clear the principle can be contracted around or rebutted. Situations that are difficult to reconcile 
with the principle of indemnity include replacement value policies and valued policies. Parties may 
also agree to a sum insured that is less than the full value of the subject matter, thus preventing a full 
indemnity being obtained. 
  
48  Crystal Imports Ltd v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London [2013] NZHC 3513, (2013) 18 ANZ 
Insurance Cases 61-997. 
49  See IV B below.  
50  Falcon Investments Corporation (NZ) Ltd v State Insurance General Manager [1975] 1 NZLR 520.  
51  Castellain v Preston, above n 7, at 386 per Brett LJ. 
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In a valued policy, the value of the property is agreed when forming the contract, which may be 
more or less than the true value of the property.52 In Irving v Manning, Patteson J stated that:53  
A policy of assurance is not a perfect contract of indemnity. It must be taken with this qualification, that 
the parties may agree beforehand in estimating the value of the subject assured … . 
The authors of Colinvaux suggest the law permits this on the understanding that the agreed amount, 
although not necessarily a perfect indemnity, can be regarded as such by reference to the terms of the 
contract.54 However, valued policies are not always easily distinguished from non-valued policies. 
The construction of the contract must make it clear what is intended. The use of the phrase "sum 
insured" in itself has been held to refer only to a maximum sum for liability.55 
Young v Commercial Union General Insurance Company Ltd demonstrates the difficulty in 
rebutting the presumption that the indemnity principle applies.56 It considered the application of a 
policy insuring household contents and personal effects in respect of a sterling silver tea set that was 
stolen. The policy held that no more than 5 per cent of the total sum insured would be paid for any 
one item (with some exceptions) unless specified. The tea set was listed as a specified item, with a 
price beside it of $22,125. A valuation was obtained and provided to the insurer to support this price. 
The Court found that on proper construction of the policy the insurer was only required to 
indemnify the insured for the indemnity value of the tea set when stolen; in this case the cost of 
obtaining a comparable tea set at $6,000. The Court concluded that the specifying of the value was 
only for the purpose of avoiding the 5 per cent limit, and the provision of the certificate of value was 
deemed solely to be intended to advise the insurer of its possible liability in order to calculate 
premiums.57  
The indemnity principle itself is not mentioned in the judgment, but its application is evident in 
the way that the policy is construed. The Court's decision shows a preference for measuring loss by 
indemnity value rather than by a value agreed upon, despite the insured being liable to pay premiums 
calculated based on the specified value of the tea set. The case signals a requirement of very clear 
wording to rebut a presumption that cover will be measured according to indemnity value, or actual 
loss. This could be read as a confirmation that the policy underlying the principle is paramount. 
  
52  Merkin and Nicoll, above n 4, at 8.2.1. 
53  Irving v Manning (1847) I HL Cas 287 (QB) at 774–775 per Patteson J. 
54  Merkin and Nicoll, above n 4, at 8.2.1. 
55  Merkin and Nicoll, above n 4, at 8.2.1. 
56  Young v Commercial Union General Insurance Company Ltd (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-875 (CA). 
57  At 75,514. 
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However, it is probably still compatible with a simple assumption that the parties did not contemplate 
the receipt of more than an indemnity. 
The position of replacement value policies in respect of the principle of indemnity is not clear. 
Lowry and Rawlings state firmly that such contracts do not accord with the notion of indemnity,58 
but believe the principle is contractual in origin, and is therefore variable.59 Furthermore, there has 
been no real resistance in Commonwealth jurisdictions to the introduction of such policies, as 
discussed above and also noted by McGee.60 Lowry and Rawlings' justification for exceptions to the 
principle and the lack of resistance to replacement policies in the Commonwealth both point toward 
a conclusion the principle is really about the presumed contractual intention of the parties, and is not 
based on policy issues.  
4 Law Reform  
In 1985, the Insurance Law Reform Act was passed. Among other things, it removed the 
requirement for an insurable interest in non-marine insurance.61 The need to prove an insurable 
interest was deemed an "unnecessary technicality" by the Statutes Revision Committee, as in 
indemnity insurance one could only recover when loss was proved.62 The Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer, 
as Minister of Justice, reiterated this sentiment during the second reading of the Bill when he noted 
that the change reflected "the fact that under an indemnity insurance policy an insured person can 
recover only the amount he has actually lost when property is destroyed or damaged".63 From this it 
seems likely that the New Zealand Parliament considers the principle to be one of broad policy, 
although the somewhat brief consideration of its relevance does not permit any firm conclusions. 
5 Conclusions 
The discussion above provides some evidence of how and why the principle works to ensure the 
plaintiff does not recover more than a full indemnity. It is clear there are exceptions to these rules that 
limit the scope of the principle. However, previous case law has demonstrated the need for strong 
wording to rebut a presumption that the indemnity principle applies, suggesting the principle is not to 
be taken lightly. It is certainly more than mere business practice, and appears to have been taken more 
seriously than as a matter of contractual intention in the past.  
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The utilisation of underlying rationales in justifying these rules further strengthens the argument 
that the indemnity principle has, at least in the past, been considered a principle based strongly on 
policy, and one not easily displaced or rebutted. The necessity of the principle to achieve the purposes 
that supposedly underlie it is doubtful in a modern context, making a presumed intention approach 
more probable.  
III THE CANTERBURY CASES 
On 4 September 2010, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake struck the Canterbury region. Several 
substantial aftershocks followed, including a 6.3 magnitude quake on 11 February 2011 that was even 
more devastating than the original quake. One hundred and eighty five lives were tragically lost, and 
the road to recovery has been a long one. The total cost of the earthquakes in private insurance claims 
is estimated at $17 billion,64 and insurers had paid out almost $15 billion in settling claims by May 
2015. 65  The earthquakes have shaken the New Zealand insurance industry. The challenges of 
reinsurance,66 costly open-ended replacement policies and numerous protracted disputes over claims 
(many remain unresolved) are among the issues faced.67 The cases discussed below arose within this 
context. 
A Ridgecrest NZ Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd 
Ridgecrest had insured a building in Christchurch with IAG. The policy provided for a maximum 
coverage of $1,984,000 "in respect of any one happening".68 This cap was to be reset after each 
happening, and cover was either for the loss or damage or estimated cost of repairs or, where 
replacement cover had been agreed, the cost of restoration or replacement if the building was damaged 
beyond repair.69 The liability cap was much less than the actual value of the building, and this fact 
was clearly understood by both parties.70  
During the currency of the policy, the building was damaged in the course of four earthquakes. 
After each of the first two earthquakes in 2010, IAG assessed the damage and commissioned repairs, 
but these were only partially completed when the February 2011 earthquake struck, after which all 
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70  At [13] and [61]. 
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repair work stopped. There was a further aftershock in June 2011, by which point the building was 
damaged beyond repair. IAG contended the building was a total loss after the February earthquake.71   
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether Ridgecrest was entitled to claim up to the liability 
limit in respect of each happening. Ridgecrest claimed for the full $1,984,000 in respect of the 
destroying earthquake, and for all the losses caused by earlier earthquakes. IAG contended that it was 
only required to pay for repairs actually undertaken in addition to the sum for the final earthquake. The 
High Court and Court of Appeal had both found for IAG, although on different grounds.72 
In discussing whether Ridgecrest's claim was precluded by the indemnity principle, the Supreme 
Court held that the principle was not engaged as the $1,984,000 cap was not based on, and was 
mutually understood as being less than, the replacement value of the building.73 The Court stated that 
the indemnity principle was an "awkward" phrase in respect of replacement value policies.74 
The Court found that the policy placed only three limits on the insured's rights: there could be no 
double counting; each happening gave rise to a separate claim subject to the specified limit; and the 
total of all claims could not exceed the replacement cost of the building.75 This final limitation was 
described as a result of the indemnity principle.76  
The Court's reasoning in the decision focused on the wording of the policy. It construed the words 
"in respect of any one happening" as meaning cover was reinstated up to the limit after each event, 
the full amount being claimable even for damage not repaired and subsequently unrepairable.77 The 
claims were not able to be subsumed into the total loss claim for the final earthquake under the merger 
doctrine. However, it was determined that the unrepaired damage was to be assessed on an indemnity 
basis by diminution in value rather than by replacement costs.78 
The Court then considered whether the claim limit of $1,984,000 should be deemed the 
replacement value of the building under the terms of the policy. It was determined that an "approach 
based firmly on the policy wording as to the resetting of liability limits" was preferable.79 The policy 
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in issue was then evaluated, with four factors leading the Court to decide the limit was not deemed to 
be replacement value. They were: 
(a) IAG had not presented its case on that basis; 
(b) It would result in the cap being applied to more than one happening, which would be 
inconsistent with the cap resetting; 
(c) Full replacement value would have caused the previous liabilities to be subsumed because it 
would not simply discharge liability for IAG, it would also cover all of Ridgecrest's previous 
losses, but the $1,984,000 was insufficient to do this; and 
(d) It would treat the policy as if it were an agreed replacement value one set at $1,984,000, 
when the policy was not structured at all like a valued policy and there was no indication in 
the policy of an intention to set an agreed value – it was mutually understood that the cap 
was not based on and was significantly less than the true replacement value of the building.80 
B Tower Insurance Ltd v Skyward Aviation 2008 Ltd (Skyward)  
The Supreme Court decision in Skyward was released a few months after Ridgecrest. It both 
endorses some of the reasoning in Ridgecrest and provides an example of a situation where the 
principle appears applicable, although the Court did not discuss it in detail and it was not decisive of 
the case.81  
A dispute arose between the parties as to what Tower was required to pay Skyward after Skyward's 
building was damaged beyond economic repair in the Christchurch earthquakes. Among other 
arguments, Tower contended that accepting Skyward's proposed measure of loss would be "contrary 
to settled principles of indemnity", because it would result in Skyward recovering approximately 
$1,100,000 for a property that had a pre-earthquake value of approximately $492,000, and was bought 
for just $450,000 two years prior to the earthquakes.82 The Court found for Skyward, and this seems 
strange in light of the principle: Skyward essentially made a profit of just over $600,000 from their 
loss. The Court did not address this aspect of Tower's argument in detail in its judgment, but it did 
make a few brief references to the principle. 
First, the Court reiterated its comment in Ridgecrest that the principle was "awkward" in the 
context of a replacement policy, adding in a footnote that Ridgecrest demonstrated how the 
"applicability of the indemnity principle is subject to the wording of the policy under consideration".83 
This latter statement would seem to be the one that most closely resembles the Court's approach in 
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respect of the principle in the case: the focus was, as in Ridgecrest, on the meaning of the policy 
wording.  
The Court also noted that replacement policies brought with them moral hazards, but described 
Tower as having been content to manage this with certain provisions in its policy. These included 
requiring reinstatement of the house and limiting replacement value recovery to reimbursement for 
expenditure actually incurred by the insured.84 
C QBE Insurance (International) Ltd v Wild South Holdings Ltd 
(QBE Insurance) 
Coming out two weeks after Ridgecrest, QBE Insurance dealt with several preliminary issues 
from three consolidated High Court cases. All three involved policies with full replacement cover to 
a sum insured and annual aggregate with automatic reinstatement of cover after loss. In each case, 
insured commercial buildings had sustained damage in the September 2010, February 2011 and June 
2011 earthquakes. The preliminary question relevant to this discussion was whether the marine 
insurance doctrine of merger applied to material damage policies. 
The Court held that Ridgecrest confirmed that the doctrine of merger could not apply to non-
marine insurance policies. However, according to the Court this did not prevent the insurers from 
relying on the indemnity principle.85 This is interesting in light of the fact that the insurer, when 
arguing for the application of merger, stated that they were seeking to ensure the application of the 
principle of indemnity itself.86 
But the Court declared that the concepts were not co-extensive, and that the principle of indemnity 
"survived" Ridgecrest,87 stating that the principle "inheres in any contract of indemnity".88 The Court 
stated that under the principle, if the total cost of reinstatement was more than the sum insured but the 
damage from each separate event was less than the sum insured, the actual loss would still be 
recoverable. This was provided the total amount was also less than the replacement cost of the 
building. However, the insured could not claim more than was necessary to repair the combined 
damage after the final event, as this would likely be less than the notional cost of repair following 
each event.89 
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The Court's approach in combining repair costs, explicitly in line with the principle of indemnity, 
was meant to prevent the insureds profiting from their loss. The Court stated that recovering expenses 
that would not actually be incurred would allow the insured to "realise a profit from the policy, a result 
probably not intended in a contract of indemnity".90  
IV THE ONGOING RELEVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE 
It is submitted that Ridgecrest signals a change in the status and scope of the principle; that its so-
called fundamental nature is less of a factor in the interpretation of policies than it purportedly was in 
1883. This is especially so in New Zealand, a Commonwealth jurisdiction, and one where wagering 
policies are no longer illegal unless they fall into the much narrower category of gambling. It is further 
submitted that the status of the principle now falls somewhere closer to presumed intention, although 
an argument can still be raised for interpreting the principle as a policy-based presumption.  
A Presumed Intention or Broad Policy? 
The approach in Ridgecrest is very much based on the unusual wording of the policy.91 The crux 
of the decision was the interpretation of the words "for any one happening" and the understanding that 
the $1,985,000 was never intended to equate to full replacement cover. In light of a result that may 
seem unsatisfactory for the insurer considering Ridgecrest was underinsured (and premiums would 
have been calculated accordingly), it does appear that the principle had a rather limited role to play in 
the case.  
The comment in Skyward that the "applicability of the principle is subject to the wording of the 
policy under consideration" affirms a narrower interpretation of the principle.92 The statement can be 
interpreted in two ways. It can be read as merely meaning the principle creates a strong presumption 
that may be rebutted by clear wording in the policy. But more probably, it treats the principle as 
reflecting the presumed intention of the parties and therefore easily displaced by inconsistent wording 
in an insurance contract. Comments and discussion in Skyward and both QBE Insurance and 
Ridgecrest all support the latter interpretation as being more likely.  
To begin with, Campbell and Stewart's paper is referenced in Skyward when the Supreme Court 
comments on the applicability of the principle, suggesting the Supreme Court does not disagree with 
the views espoused in the paper, namely that the principle applies as a matter of presumed intention.93 
The Court of Appeal's emphasis in QBE Insurance on profit being "a result probably not intended" in 
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an indemnity contract,94 rather than declaring profit undesirable for substantial policy reasons also 
shows a focus on the intentions of the parties over policy. 
The Supreme Court's comments in respect of double counting in Ridgecrest provide further 
support for a presumed intention status for the indemnity principle. The decision addresses how 
double counting is prevented by the principle of indemnity applying more broadly in respect of any 
separately identifiable building element first damaged and then later destroyed in successive events.95 
When explaining the problem with double counting, however, the Court stated that "such a result 
would rationally be seen by insurers as unintended" as justification for suggesting "the courts should 
endeavour to avoid" it.96 The emphasis, instead of being based on a policy argument of preventing a 
profit to the insured, is again on interpreting the intentions of the parties. 
B Merger and Unsatisfactory Outcomes 
The authors of Colinvaux have compared the treatment of the principle in both Ridgecrest and 
QBE Insurance and found the former wanting. They disagree with the reasoning behind the non-
application of merger in non-marine insurance, submitting that the doctrine should apply to both types 
unless ousted by agreement.97 They found the Court of Appeal's conclusions in QBE Insurance that 
indemnity could be applied although merger was foreclosed by Ridgecrest unconvincing: "merger is, 
after all, no more than an application of the indemnity principle in the limited situation where a partial 
and total loss occur in the same policy period".98 They conclude the Court of Appeal’s decision was 
in conflict with the Supreme Court on this point, and that the former's reasoning, being more 
compatible with the principle of indemnity, is preferable.99 It should be noted that Robert Merkin (an 
editor of Colinvaux), writing on behalf of DLA Piper New Zealand, states that the firm believes the 
judgment is restricted to policies mirroring four particular features of the one in Ridgecrest.100 
However, the authors of Insurance Claims in New Zealand, Paul Michalik and Christopher Boys, 
believe it will apply more generally.101 
While it is not possible to discuss the merger issue in depth here, one might draw the conclusion 
that the guaranteed application of the merger doctrine in marine insurance gives the principle the 
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effect of a legal test. In contrast, the clear unavailability of the doctrine in non-marine insurance 
following Ridgecrest limits the scope of the principle outside of marine insurance.  
C Current Relevance of the Principle 
There are two substantive points made by the Supreme Court that appear to derive directly from 
the indemnity principle and suggest its future scope (other than its acknowledgement that indemnity 
is a core principle of insurance). These are two of the three limitations on Ridgecrest's claim: no 
double counting and no recovery exceeding the replacement cost of the building. A substantial part 
of the Ridgecrest decision is dedicated to considering the principle's application, which is itself an 
acknowledgement of the principle's relevance. The consideration given to the principle by academics 
and in numerous other cases is further evidence that the principle of indemnity is certainly much more 
than mere business practice.  
The Ridgecrest and Skyward approach is more focused on policy wording than public policy in 
comparison to previous (especially historical) case law, with the courts seemingly content to describe 
the principle as awkward in respect of replacement cost insurance. This further supports an argument 
that the principle is not as vital to insurance contracts as was suggested in Castellain v Preston. 
"Awkward" can be read as another way of saying the principle is subordinate to the focus in ordinary 
contract law on contractual intention. Michalik and Boys have also come to this conclusion, 
interpreting the approach in Skyward as an illustration of how "courts have been alive to the primacy 
to be given to the insurer's policy promises as overriding any understanding that insurance in general 
gives only an indemnity".102 
It is submitted that most of the reasoning and the overall outcome indicate that the principle's 
influence is strictly limited by the wording of an insurance policy. In this sense, the principle, being 
less based on achieving its original purposes and directed more at not frustrating the intentions of the 
parties, is certainly more akin to a presumption of contractual intention rather than an overarching 
policy-based principle. This may be desirable; a presumed intention approach allows greater freedom 
of contract and can better meet the desires of the parties on a case-by-case basis. This approach would 
imply that although in Ridgecrest and QBE Insurance the insurers' liability was limited by the 
replacement value of the building, an insured may still recover for notional loss rather than actual loss 
in indemnity insurance, if the policy so provides.  
D Where to from Here? 
It is submitted that a new conception of the principle following Ridgecrest is likely to be mostly 
revelatory rather than revolutionary. While the principle was once deemed a fundamental one and is 
still referred to as such, this has not in the past prevented the courts from allowing flexibility for 
agreed value policies and new-for-old provisions. The Canterbury earthquakes presented some novel 
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cases in property insurance where successive losses were not repaired before further or total loss, 
creating results that appear at odds with the principle in some respects. But it does not necessarily 
follow that these decisions that seemingly subvert the principle are creating sudden, new change. 
While older case law like Castellain v Preston and Godin v London Assurance Co seems to make the 
position very clear and base the principle strongly on underlying rationales, the principle has already 
become somewhat superfluous in relation to these purposes, as discussed above.  
This does not mean that the principle lacks relevance. The judgment in Ridgecrest illustrates that 
a result obviously unintended by either party (such as an insured realising a profit from a policy) is to 
be avoided. The indemnity principle still offers an attractive method for parties to utilise in the 
assessment of loss after an event, one that aids in understanding the meaning of loss and limits the 
liability of the insurer. It is likely that in most cases it will be very obvious that neither party intended 
a result at odds with the principle. In essence the principle simply becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
it applies because parties intend it to apply.  
Replacement value insurance, agreed value policies, the requirements of IPSA and the decision 
in Ridgecrest all show that parties are perfectly capable of agreeing to distribute risk according to their 
own preference and to contract out of the principle. Perhaps what is needed now is to recognise that 
the principle provides a set of rules that one may contract into, although it will presumably still apply 
in cases of any ambiguity. It is possible that the decisions in Ridgecrest, Skyward, and QBE Insurance, 
in making this change in approach more evident, will precipitate such recognition, and inspire more 
express acknowledgement of the principle in insurance contracts. In other words, the Ridgecrest and 
Skyward decisions will both reflect and instigate changes in thinking; yet another self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
In terms of addressing any new issues of moral hazard that may arise from a principle of indemnity 
that is focused more on presumed intention, it seems reasonable to assume that where a profit is 
contemplated or at least possible, insurers will have the foresight to include provisions to mitigate 
their risk (and indeed they are required to address such issues under IPSA). The Canterbury 
earthquakes provided examples of new challenges for insurers to deal with, whether it be successive 
losses followed by total loss before repairs could be completed, or unexpected costs involved in 
replacing a building under a new-for-old policy. Insurers have already begun to address these risks. 
For example, insurers now offer sum insured replacement policies in property insurance instead of 
open-ended policies.103 A principle that is not applied as uniformly as once thought is a consideration 
insurers can take into account when writing insurance policies. 
Another possibility, however, is a potential return to treating the principle in a broad policy sense 
as a reaction to what may be seen by some as an undesirable direction for the law. As discussed, one 
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expert in conjunction with a major insurance law firm, has already taken the approach that the case 
ought to be confined to the specific and unusual wording of the policy at issue.104 A broad policy-
based presumption approach is still a workable interpretation following Ridgecrest and Skyward. It 
still allows room for acknowledgement of the terms of the policy, where those terms are sufficiently 
clear to displace the presumption the principle applies.  
The willingness of the courts, insurers and insureds to adapt where required suggests the change 
may be a more permanent one. An example of this willingness to adapt is the widespread use of 
replacement policies in New Zealand prior to 2010. Indemnity value simply does not always 
adequately address the needs and desires of an insured. Insurers have adapted to meet market demand, 
and addressed any increased risk accordingly (both through mechanisms to reduce moral hazard and 
the more recent adoption of sum insured policies). Surely recognition of a new conception of the 
principle is appropriate in a modern context, rather than clinging to strict principles developed 
hundreds of years ago in a different commercial environment. On a final note, whether the principle 
is based on policy or presumed intention, its status must be made clear to contracting parties. Greater 
certainty is desirable as it provides parties with the ability to better manage their risk. 
V CONCLUSION 
Phrases such as "indemnity is 'fundamental' to insurance", or "one cannot receive more than a full 
indemnity", are often repeated – perhaps at risk of sounding hollow – without clarification of their 
true impact on interpretation of insurance policies. 
In Ridgecrest and Skyward, the purposes underlying the principle were not as important as the 
wording of the policy itself, and indeed some of those underlying purposes can now be achieved 
through other methods, if they are not almost obsolete already. The approach taken towards the 
principle by the Supreme Court suggests it is in fact not a contentious matter for parties to contract 
out of the principle if they so desire. An understanding that the principle is contractual in origin 
necessitates that the contractual intention of the parties will take priority over any notion of a general 
indemnity principle. The principle is still relevant under this presumption of intention approach; it 
will apply where the policy does not contradict it and in cases of ambiguity. It is important that this is 
made clear to insurers and insureds alike, that they may be fully informed when contracting. 
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